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Claims to new or critical knowledge can 
often be non-performative. Building off of 
this assumption, this paper demonstrates 
the ways in which the 2010-2011 uprisings 
across the Middle East and North Africa 
have been analysed through approaches 
that claim to be critical and post-Oriental-
ist and yet reproduce problematic as-
sumptions about the region, revealing 
their connection to a longer genealogy 
dating back to Orientalism. This serves to 
sanitize the uprisings by virtue of a neo-
liberal agenda that reproduces the ‘Mid-
dle East’ straitjacket, in turn creating a ty-
pology not too different from realist 
analysis in the region that (re)posits ‘Arab 
exceptionalism.’ Claims to being critical, 
or making a critical turn, are thus ques-
tioned in this paper through an analysis 
that shows how theory has been in the 
interest of power through the appropria-
tion of native informants into the academ-
ic complex of think-tanks, Western donor 
institutions, and foreign media.
Taking our cue from Edward Said, we ex-
plore how new approaches have pre-
sented themselves as critical and have 
disrobed themselves of their exotic and 
explicit racist discourse, despite the fact 
that the same assumptions continue to 
lurk in the background. Using Sara 
Ahmed’s notion of the non-performativ-
ity of claims to being critical, we survey 
how the Middle East is being reshaped 
through these ‘new’ and ‘critical’ ap-
proaches that in essence are apologetic 
to neoliberalism and liberal governmen-
tality at large. We show how minorities 
continue to be an intervention mecha-
nism under the so-called ‘freedom of be-
lief’ agenda, how the ‘democracy para-
digm’ advances electoralism as freedom, 
and how rights-based approaches with 
their underlying (neo)liberal assump-
tions continue to determine gender pol-
itics and analysis despite postcolonial 
interventions. 
By presenting a contemporary genealogy 
of Middle East studies and surveying calls 
for proposals for journal articles, media 
publications, Western think-tank reports, 
donor programs and Civil Society Orga-
nizations’ (CSOs) expansion into the Mid-
dle East, this paper argues that this form 
of surveillance, though masquerading as 
‘critical,’ builds off of neoliberal govern-
mentality. This, in turn, molds a subjectiv-
ity that reifies the Middle East as a stag-
nant entity. 
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Introduction 
The uprisings that spread across the Mid-
dle East and North Africa in 2010 and 2011 
quickly gave rise to calls for analysis that 
could explain the supposedly unexpected 
events. Four years later, this drive for ex-
planations and theoretical innovations has 
continued, within the pluralist celebration 
of ‘the more the merrier.’ This has not only 
occurred within academia, but also within 
policy-making circles.1  No one has paused 
to investigate these analyses pedagogi-
cally and how they have had an effect on 
reproducing ‘Middle East studies’, as well 
as the term ‘the Middle East’. As side de-
bates rage on about interdisciplinarity and 
reflexivity within area studies, in particular 
Middle East studies (Wilson 855), the dis-
cipline as a whole remains unscathed and 
continues to be encapsulated in the para-
digm of Eurocentrism (Massad 37-38). To 
add insult to injury, most analysis now her-
alds itself as ‘critical.’ This is precisely what 
this paper aims to probe: Orientalist rep-
resentations of, that in turn shape, ‘the 
Middle East’ as anarchic, radical, misogy-
nist, and on the verge of being a failed 
state. This representational move can 
mount a new attack by way of positing it-
self as critical, and in so doing, hiding its 
material ramifications as it furthers neolib-
eral policies.2
The performativity of claims to being ‘crit-
ical’ or new are important to assess, par-
ticularly in light of the increasing tendency 
to make such claims as protection against 
accusations of Eurocentrism. Sara Ahmed 
has noted that a claim to being critical can 
be just that: a claim, without substance, 
and therefore one that does not perform 
what it says it will. The non-performativity 
of a concept is important to trace: con-
cepts and theories do not always perform 
in the ways in which they claim to perform. 
Claims to ‘being critical’ should always be 
probed, as a claim to being critical does 
not replace the act itself. Using examples 
from the post-uprisings period, this paper 
shows how the neoliberal agenda oper-
ates through this claim and in effect sani-
tizes the potential of the uprisings. How-
ever—and this is crucial—claims to being 
critical are non-performative in the sense 
of failing to perform a critical task; but they 
remain performative in other ways, nota-
bly in the way they reproduce certain as-
sumptions and paradigms (ibid.). This two-
fold process is what we address in this 
paper: on the one hand, we aim to dem-
onstrate the non-performativity of claims 
within Middle East studies to be critical, 
new, or post-Orientalist; and on the other 
hand, we show how this non-performativ-
ity in terms of being critical still performs 
other functions that are often hidden, 
namely the reproduction of the field of 
Middle East studies along the lines of an 
Orientalist Eurocentrism. Middle East 
studies seem to be predicated on the In-
ternational Relations notion of Hobbesian 
‘anarchy’ that it cannot move past, a point 
we will touch on later.
This paper thus seeks to probe these pro-
cesses in order to demonstrate that the so-
called ‘critical turn’ taken by many scholars 
within Middle East studies in fact relies on 
similar assumptions as previous work that 
has been categorized as Eurocentric or 
Orientalist. The non-performativity of the 
claim to be critical as well as the performa-
tivity of the reproduction of a Eurocentric 
Middle East will be probed through an 
analysis that focuses on three key areas of 
debate within Middle East studies: civil so-
ciety and the democracy paradigm, gen-
der justice through rights-based ap-
proaches, and the ‘minority question.’ The 
furthering of neoliberalism through claims 
to be critical occurs in each of these de-
bates, which in turn continue to reproduce 
the Middle East in a Eurocentric manner.
Genealogy of the Literature Leading up to 
2011
It is commonly assumed that post-positiv-
ist literature3 has shown the weaknesses of 
positivism and led to the emergence of 
‘new’ approaches that challenge its central 
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position (Smith, Booth, Zalewski 6). These 
new approaches are lauded for their criti-
cal and reflexive approach to knowledge 
production (Tickner). Despite this, these 
approaches continue to be dominated by 
the world hegemon: the US (Smith). The 
understanding of these ‘new’ approaches 
as critical and reflexive eschews the ‘con-
structivist turn’ that has been applied to 
the Middle East with largely the same apo-
logia to the dominant benevolent hege-
mon, the US (Banai). Banai, for example, 
openly advocates, through a purely con-
structivist lens that problematizes norms, 
that the US should in fact engage in de-
mocracy promotion, but critiques the ap-
proach of President George W. Bush and 
openly commends that of President 
Obama. Some scholars have even made 
inroads using a critical security studies ap-
proach that utilizes ‘speech-act’, a similarly 
post-positivist approach that relies on dis-
course analysis. This approach serves to 
‘desecuritize’ the Middle East, which by a 
sleight of hand is marked as inherently un-
stable, by linking it economically to the 
dominant and ‘stable’ democracy of Israel 
(Christou and Adamides, 2013). This ties 
back to Smith’s claim that IR is produced 
as apologetic to the hegemon: in this case 
it is produced in service of the Middle 
East’s policeman: Israel. These brief exam-
ples all show essentialized notions that 
constitute the Middle East as war-torn and 
damned place while hiding neo-imperial 
Western intervention. It also furthers a 
neoliberal agenda and simultaneously 
adopts a racialized idea of Arabs as being 
savage, at times implicitly or explicitly call-
ing for them to be tamed. This takes the 
form of either legal exceptionalism and 
pausing the Geneva Conventions (condi-
tioning their applicability only to the civi-
lized races); or at other times designating 
the Middle East as rampant with ‘failed 
states.’4 Both consequences of this desig-
nation and construction of the Middle East 
means that development requires the civ-
ilized West to enter benevolently whilst 
the neoliberal agenda becomes more hid-
den. Moreover, it is because of this that 
Eurocentric notions are reconciled with 
Islamists in order to further the Eurocentric 
goals of neoliberalism.
There is no clearer example of neoliberal 
discourse that seeks to be critical and new 
than the issue in which both articles were 
published: Security Dialogue’s 2013 spe-
cial issue titled The New Middle East: A 
Critical Appraisal. In this issue, Banai seeks 
to present a narrative in which rights and 
freedoms are the focus of the Arab Spring 
in which he constructs protestors as vying 
for those rights, as opposed to calling for 
social justice and protesting against neo-
imperialism. This is precisely the general 
argument of this paper: post-positivist ap-
proaches claiming critical knowledge and 
masquerading as novel in order to hide 
their neoliberal agenda. This serves to ob-
scure the fact that the Arab uprisings have 
rejected such economic linkages to capi-
tal within the agenda of neoliberalism de-
spite a sanitized version existing in the lit-
erature on the Arab Spring. Banai’s 
argument meshes well with that of Chris-
tou and Adamides, from the same issue of 
Security Dialogue, as both have a gaping 
lacuna: they both neglect to mention the 
occurrence of events that demonstrate the 
clear opposition towards Israel through-
out the Arab Spring. For example, in Au-
gust 2011 Egyptian protesters nearly 
stormed Israel’s Cairo embassy, climbing 
and breaching the top floor of the apart-
ment complex housing the embassy to 
protest the death of Egyptian border 
guards caused by Israeli border guards 
pursuing militants near the Rafah border 
strip. Egypt threatened to withdraw its Am-
bassador from Tel Aviv and almost did, 
posting an online statement that it was 
withdrawing its ambassador, but later 
withdrawing it in a mysterious manner 
(Ahramonline). Such omissions of key 
events can only take place if a democracy 
lens is superimposed on the analysis that 
in effect prioritizes individual rights whilst 
omitting power politics and social justice 
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as analytical categories that obscure neo-
liberalism. 
Banai performs this pedagogically in the 
parallel he draws between the Iranian rev-
olution and the Arab Spring. Banai distin-
guishes the case of Iran in 1979 by saying 
that its failure was due to “[the] discussion 
[...] being in terms of anti-imperialism and 
social justice issues, and not about the fu-
ture of democracy in Iran” (420). In this 
case Banai’s operational definition of de-
mocracy is one that firmly eschews anti-
imperialism and the notion of social jus-
tice, replicating an almost Cold War-like 
McCarthyism. After this definition he goes 
on to lament the Arab Spring activists who 
do further the cause for democracy. This 
genealogy of democracy is extremely Eu-
rocentric in casting democracy literature 
as being individualistic, liberal and further-
ing rights-based approaches whilst ignor-
ing more accepted critiques, such as Din-
gwerth’s, for the need to probe areas 
where social justice can actually be a de-
fining characteristic of ‘democracy’ as op-
posed to procedural definitions of de-
mocracy that live off electoralism. 
But it would be foolish to think that Banai 
is alone in his definition, just as it would be 
foolish to think Banai (420) is critical be-
cause he can cite Robert Cox’s (129) fa-
mous phrase: theory ‘is always for some-
one and for some purpose.’ Banai just so 
happens to elide his theory’s purpose and 
its Eurocentrism by critiquing that of oth-
ers and calling for reflexivity. Indeed this is 
a clear instance of the non-performativity 
of a claim to being critical: while Banai 
cites Robert Cox’s argument about theory 
and power, and even calls for others to be 
reflexive, his own analysis clearly repro-
duces Eurocentrism and thus cannot be 
seen as critical. Banai’s ideas resonate well 
with US media. See, for example, respons-
es towards 2012 socialist presidential can-
didate Hamdeen Sabahy from major US 
media outlets. The New York Times vilified 
Sabahy, who ended up coming third and 
missing the run-off elections by less than 
three percentage points from the second 
frontrunner Ahmed Shafik, for opposing 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
loan and labeled him as “against the mar-
ket” (New York Times). Foreign Policy sim-
ilarly lambasted Sabahy with an odd fea-
ture piece title: “More Trouble for the IMF 
in Egypt.” It is precisely such depictions 
that show the prowess of the IMF in Egypt 
and the ‘irrationality’ of opposing such an 
institution that furthers Orientalism–and, 
importantly, neoliberalism—alongside de-
velopmental linear paradigms in order to 
help the ‘Third World.’ Foreign Policy has 
recruited native informants to similarly 
lambast Sabahy decrying his policies as “a 
far cry from what the country needs” 
(Dahshan). These Orientalist narratives es-
chew the larger causality of opposition to 
Mubarak and Ben Ali’s regimes for their 
neoliberal agendas; as such narratives 
firmly exclude the Gafsa and Mahala work-
er revolts in Egypt and Tunisia in 2008 
(Hanieh). Indeed the exclusion of worker 
revolts from much of the post-uprisings 
analysis clearly reveals the neoliberal un-
derpinnings or these so-called ‘critical’ ap-
proaches. 
Another aspect of this discussion is the 
famed ‘moderation thesis’ of Islamists 
(Lynch; Basly) which essentially remains 
little more than performativity to hide 
power politics. Interestingly this thesis not 
only hinges on taming the ‘Arab radicals’ 
but similarly on liberal ideas, rights-based 
approaches and individual freedoms. 
Rajaa Basly wrote a piece in Carnegie’s 
Sada Journal warning that:
[The] growth of fundamentalist Salaf-
ism puts al-Nahda in an awkward po-
sition, and may force it to reposition 
itself after the Salafists have led dem-
onstrations chanting bigoted and anti-
Semitic slogans, and attacked liquor 
stores and unveiled women.
Here there is a clear juxtaposition be-
tween Salafis (radical Islamists) and 
al-Nahda (moderate Islamists). Similarly, 
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take Middle East Foreign Policy Editor 
and George Washington Professor Marc 
Lynch’s opinion on the ‘polarization’ of 
politics in Tunisia and reference to how al-
Nahda were “unsure about how to grap-
ple with the rising Salafi trend.” This posit-
ing of a spectrum and the performativity 
of this fear factor automatically preempts 
any questions and ups the credentials of 
moderate Islamists. It also takes the 
Hobbesian idea of anarchy to new heights 
and attunes it to the Middle East by throw-
ing radical Islamists into the mix, adding 
a cultural dimension to the IR argument. 
Such statements carry big omissions of 
assassinations of the opposition such as 
the death of Choukri Belaid, which was 
widely believed to be the work of the rul-
ing party al-Nahda by way of tolerating 
increasing violence, Belaid’s comrade—
Abdel Nasser Laouni—accused al-Nahda 
directly of perpetrating the murder (al-
Akhbar). Echoing Lynch some describe 
such Islamists as a “safety valve for moder-
ate Islam” while simultaneously arguing 
that “[i]f it wasn’t for the Brotherhood, 
most of the youths of this era would have 
chosen the path of violence” (Leiken 
2007). This article, like most of the litera-
ture on the Arab Spring relied on the 
youth as a malleable category that has the 
power to shape Islamists and bend them 
to modernity. Basly’s piece ended on a 
similar note urging Tunisians to “balance 
modernism and traditionalism.” Evoking 
“traditionalism” in such a blanket way 
without engaging it furthers anthropo-
centric colonial notions of essentialized 
native ‘traditions’ (Mamdani). Other like-
minded think-tankers and native infor-
mants argue that this moderation is ap-
parent in that the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) is taking “the long view,” (Hamid). It 
is interesting that the racist-realist argu-
ment (Hobson),5 manifested here in terms 
of the moderation thesis,6 is made in the 
Journal of Foreign Affairs, the flagship 
publication of the Council of Foreign Re-
lations think-tank, heir and previous 
namesake to the Journal of Race Devel-
opment.7 The genealogy attests to the 
once racial-turned-Eurocentric argument. 
The only way such knowledge can retain 
its ‘critical’ veneer is because it is placed 
alongside positivist realist literature that 
posits the Middle East as a sub-system 
with its own anarchic system. Here Bahgat 
Korany’s critique of Robert Kaplan is im-
portant. It posits that the representation of 
the Middle East’s anarchic relationship is 
exceptional. This realism has unveiled its 
racial underpinnings in which the savages 
are the impending threat and must be bal-
anced against or kept in check. Examples 
of such racist-realist writing, as Hobson 
has triangulated with the eighteenth cen-
tury, insinuate with analysis of the conven-
tional ‘security dilemma’ and the ‘failed 
state thesis.’ The persistence of such anal-
ysis is explained by the fact that pedagog-
ically there are few security journals that 
are not borne out of flagship think-tanks 
or institutions where funding, and edito-
rial managers, determine loyalty and di-
rection. This problem has been so notice-
able that other competitive journals have 
pointed it out. It is no surprise that these 
more independent journals are open-ac-
cess, are not behind a pay wall and do not 
require membership fees.8
Expanding on the analytic qualities of real-
ism and the ‘security dilemma,’ security in 
the anarchic world and its analysis be-
comes key. Egyptian native informant 
think-tankers write that Egypt’s security 
problem needs to address rights-based 
agendas whilst simultaneously holding 
them to a worldwide counter terrorism 
goal that ‘serves US interests.’ This recon-
ciliation is achieved by a racial performa-
tivity: the Egyptian ‘crackdown’ is ineffec-
tive and needs to be reworked with US 
assistance and European help, thus as-
suming that both players are neutral and 
professional with their own counterterror-
ism policies (Radwan). The racism is appar-
ent in the assumption that only the White 
West can master safe, civilized policing 
tactics. An example of this is the way in 
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which racism creeps in when advocating 
the necessary Israeli ‘deterrence strikes’ 
against Palestinians, even if civilians. This 
racial othering happens by openly advo-
cating the killing of civilians in violation of 
the great Eurocentric mantle: the Geneva 
Convention. This is something one would 
think in the twenty-first century would be 
taken as a fait accompli, but it shows pre-
cisely the double Eurocentric/racial bind: 
the Geneva Convention, a European cre-
ation, does not apply outside Europe be-
cause previously designated barbarians, 
Palestinian civilians, are a ‘necessary’ casu-
alty to ‘reel in Hamas’ (Herzog). Palestinian 
civilians are willing to die as human 
shields, they have no feelings, they want 
to die, and therefore they deserve to die; 
the right to life enshrined in the Geneva 
Convention does not apply to them.
 It is clear that in the examples pre-
sented above, alternative genealogies 
that do not stop at the toppling of Arab 
presidents in 2010-2011 and that include a 
host of forces that are hostile to the neo-
liberal agenda are ignored. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to detail these ar-
guments, but other avenues of research 
have highlighted how there exists alterna-
tive historicizations of the Arab uprisings 
that tackle the issue of imperialism 
(Hanieh) and which problematize the issue 
of neoliberal policies (Elyachar), austerity 
and structural readjustment (Alexander 
and Bassiouny).
Triangulating Neoliberalism
The main thrust of the argument is that 
neoliberalism is represented as the only 
logical path to development. When Egyp-
tian actors are seen as unwilling to comply 
with this, racist and Orientalist depictions 
are used to explain this supposed insub-
ordination (to global capital). The key link 
between neoliberalism and ‘Islamism’ in 
general is that to move past previous Ori-
entalist representations of ‘Islam’ as an 
ideology (Islamism), it must be seen to be 
market-compatible. This means for Islam 
to be palatable, and to disrobe itself of its 
previous depictions, it must be ready to 
accept austerity policies and be docile to 
foreign capital. This phenomenon is what 
Timothy Mitchell (203), playing on Benja-
min Barber’s concept of “McWorld,” calls 
“McJihad.” It is a helpful way of under-
standing “the political violence the United 
States, not alone […]has funded and pro-
moted,” by way of promoting Islamists. 
Mitchell argues “it would seem to follow 
that political Islam plays an unacknowl-
edged role in the making of what we call 
global capitalism” (ibid.). 
The attention that has been paid to Is-
lamist forces post Arab Spring is particu-
larly notable in relation to neoliberalism, 
where Islamists were collectively promot-
ed as the ‘moderates’ compared to the 
‘crazy socialists.’ One example is the MB in 
Egypt pledging to honor Camp David 
while Hamdeen Sabahy called for its 
amendment and made his position 
against it clear. This is similar to Tunisia, 
where al-Nahda has accepted an IMF loan 
and begun restructuring its economy 
along neoliberal parameters. Due to the 
sanitized narrative of the Arab Spring and 
its various exclusions, few remember that 
the MB in Egypt also signed a Stand-By 
Agreement (SBA) with the IMF under MB 
president Mohammed Morsi.9 Islamists in 
the Arab Spring are heralded as a group 
that have been oppressed for too long —
despite the fact that socialists too have 
been similarly oppressed—and that have 
been portrayed as coming back for their 
glory. Out of this comes the moderation 
thesis in relation to Islamists, which is little 
more than a euphemism for neoliberaliza-
tion. This sleight of hand is performed in 
two parts: first Islamists in both Egypt and 
Tunisia sought to play off fears that rising 
Salafist movements represented a threat 
to the political order and that socialists 
were ‘against the market,’ thus calling for 
both to be excluded. In this sense, such 
Islamists stand to actually gain by fanning 
the flames of extremist Islamism by posi-
tioning themselves as ‘moderate’ relative 
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to rising Salafists and outlandish socialists. 
Embracing the notion of ‘moderate Is-
lamists’ allows Western academics to be 
presented as critical and post-Orientalist, 
because they have overcome their other-
ing of Islamism as a whole. This embracing 
was seen in the West’s silence over Egypt’s 
MB violence and extrajudicial usurping of 
power by a constitutional declaration that 
declared Morsi immune to judicial review 
in order to pass an authoritarian constitu-
tion, as well as the silence over the vio-
lence that followed. This was in addition to 
the police-sanctioned attacks against a 
funeral procession outside the Egyptian 
Coptic cathedral in 2012 that resulted in 
the police attacking the cathedral itself 
with teargas. In Tunisia in 2012, this was 
mirrored with a strike and mass protests 
following al-Nahda’s move to arrest oppo-
sition figures. Tunisia differed from Egypt 
in that a concession was eventually given 
with a new coalition government.
 There is a clear attempt at white-
washing even in how foreign governments 
chose to intervene in the Arab Spring: 
through representing  bilateral aid as tech-
nical, neutral and value-free. That is why 
there is a Westernized Arab audience that 
continues to ask why Western aid is not 
forthcoming, demonstrating that the de-
bate is already set within the parameters 
of aid being seen as welcome. In a rare 
show of frank yet outright Orientalism, Re-
publican Senator Lindsey Graham of 
South Carolina noted on CBS’ Face the 
Nation (Hill) that: 
What would happen if we cut off the aid 
is that Western tourism ends in Egypt for 
the foreseeable future for as far as the eye 
can see [...]Western investment comes to 
a standstill. Egypt becomes a beggar cli-
ent state of the Arab Gulf states. Egypt’s 
future is really damned[...]. We’re the 
strongest nation on earth. Everybody that 
sides with us tends to do better than peo-
ple we oppose.
This is a civilizational and Orientalist rep-
resentation in that the strong US can bend 
Egypt’s arm in order to make it beg, be-
cause it is seen as on the point of becom-
ing a failed state. This is similar to Hob-
son’s idea of the Eurocentric nature of the 
‘failed states’ thesis and the paternalistic 
attitude and form of intervention it invites. 
It involves a doctor-patient cancer meta-
phor in which the doctor must first break 
the patient’s body and defense in order to 
cure him of the ‘disease.’ It is interesting, 
but not surprising, to see that liberal Egyp-
tian opposition figures, such as Mohamed 
El Baradei, through the invitation of West-
ern media, discuss Egypt through these 
parameters, identifying it as being close to 
a failed state.10
 Neoliberalism’s inclusion of ‘po-
litical Islam’ has been inundated with a 
logic of accumulation of foreign capital 
and austerity politics. This representation 
continues to Orientalize politics in a bid to 
disfranchise socialists who are—to borrow 
from the New York Times—“against the 
market.” This post-Orientalist notion con-
tinues that performativity; to be post-Ori-
entalist is to perform a novelty that claims 
a departure from, but performs that very 
function of, Orientalism. 
Civil Society and the Democracy Para-
digm: The Case of Democracy Promotion
Democracy and civil society have been re-
current themes in debates on the Arab up-
risings. They are conceptualized as being 
of particular importance to the region’s 
future, and thus in need of being strength-
ened. However, much of these debates 
clearly reproduce a Eurocentric and lib-
eral teleology that hide specific assump-
tions about what democracy and civil so-
ciety actually are, and that also hide the 
connection between these assumptions 
and the furthering of neoliberalization. In 
spite of the continuing use of Eurocentric 
understandings of democracy and civil so-
ciety, there remains the claim of being 
critical and new. It is thus important to in-
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terrogate this, and show that in fact there 
is continuity and not disjuncture in the 
ways in which democracy and civil society 
are imagined.
Despite being one of the buzzwords of 
our times, ‘democracy’ is rarely clearly de-
fined by scholars or writers who work on 
the contemporary Middle East. It seems to 
be the case that it is presented as though 
it has no underlying assumptions: a con-
cept that simply makes sense. The aim in 
this section is to unpack what ‘democracy’ 
is and how it is represented in reference to 
the 2010-2011 uprisings, and in turn what it 
meant by ‘democracy promotion,’ an activ-
ity directly linked to civil society.11 Indeed it 
is clear that the form of democracy that is 
usually referred to is, first, one among 
many, and second, the form that is most 
conducive to neoliberalism by way of elec-
toralism and fascination with representa-
tionalism through elected representatives 
as opposed to a notion of accountability. 
In other words, what is at stake here is the 
representation of democracy such that the 
globalized standard today is revamped. 
Procedural democracy becomes the top 
priority, as this fosters continued neoliber-
alization, and this favouring of procedural 
democracy occurs at the expense of other 
conceptualizations of democracy. As ar-
gued by Tagma et al., this demonstrates a 
clear liberal bias: “The understanding of 
democracy displayed here is clearly at 
odds with other understandings of de-
mocracy—such as radical democracy, 
which sees politics as consisting of lengthy 
and open-ended contestations, or social 
democracy, which is suggestive of social 
justice, solidarity and egalitarianism” 
(386). As mentioned in the first section of 
this paper, the dominant conceptualiza-
tion of democracy thus ignores neo-impe-
rialism and social justice whilst focusing 
on electoralism. Moreover, this dominant 
conceptualization articulates specific con-
ditions as necessary for the ‘transition’ to 
democracy, most notably: a free market, a 
‘strong’ civil society, human rights, and a 
host of individual civic liberties. 
In the literature on the Middle East it is as-
sumed that civil society is the ‘private 
sphere’ whose function is to exist as a 
space of freedom that restricts the power 
of the state, conceptualized as the organs 
of government. The state in Arab contexts 
is represented as particularly authoritarian 
and thus in need of an especially powerful 
civil society that can restrain it. Altan-Olcay 
and Icduygu note that civil society organi-
zations are seen as outside of the state, 
mediating the relationship between citi-
zens and the (authoritarian) state. Thus 
civil society organizations are seen as or-
ganizations that bring about tolerance, 
peace and civility (159). As NGOs started 
to proliferate across the Arab world, they 
began to be conceptualized as a possible 
counterbalance to authoritarian states. As 
Islah Jad writes, “The expansion of NGOs 
is widely viewed as constituting the devel-
opment of an Arab ‘civil society’ that can 
contain the authoritarian state and as a 
healthy sign of real, ‘bottom-up’ democ-
racy in the region” (177). Jad also notes, 
however, that the proliferation of NGOs 
may also be viewed as a new and growing 
form of dependency on the West.
Indeed the link between civil society in 
countries like Egypt and democracy pro-
motion confirms this relationship of de-
pendency. Democracy promotion has be-
come one of the pillars of American 
foreign policy and democratization has 
been central to the conditionality imposed 
on Middle Eastern countries by interna-
tional actors (Stivachtis 102). As argued by 
Stivachtis, democracy promotion cannot 
but place countries on a civilizational hier-
archy and create unequal relations within 
international society (111). Civil society in 
postcolonial contexts has constituted one 
of the main mediums through which de-
mocracy promotion is spread, which has 
rendered civil society as one of the most 
crucial spaces in ‘post-revolutionary’ Arab 
countries. Following this, civil society has 
been posited as essential to democratic 
transitions and thus any events perceived 
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as ‘attacks’ on civil society are seen as neg-
atively affecting the prospects of the Arab 
uprisings themselves. The centrality of civ-
il society means that the literature on its 
role in Arab countries is extensive, particu-
larly among think-tanks. Hisham Hellyer, a 
Brookings fellow who boasts expertise on 
the region, has written that “civil society is 
critical to Egypt’s transitional process—be-
cause it does jobs that no one else has the 
time or inclination to do. Egypt is a stron-
ger country if civil society is stronger.” In a 
post for USAID, Mahmoud Farouk—Direc-
tor of Egyptian Center for Public Policy 
studies—writes: “While Egypt’s civil society 
plays an important role in defending civil-
ian rights and promoting development, 
civil society organizations frequently find 
themselves under criticism. Our contribu-
tions are belittled. Our work is obstructed. 
Our motivations are called into question.” 
He suggests that the solution to this is to 
produce films that explain to Egyptians 
what civil society is. The Atlantic Council, 
arguing in a similar vein, has even sug-
gested that Egyptians do not yet under-
stand the role and importance of civil so-
ciety: “The fact is that civil society as a 
legitimate (and beneficial) zone of activity 
separate from the state is not yet a widely 
accepted concept in Egypt.” They go on to 
call for a fair NGO law that is rational and 
that allows for freedom of expression. It is 
difficult to miss the paternalism in many of 
these articles and statements. Indeed 
Charles Dunne, Director of the MENA 
Freedom House project, in a hearing on 
“The Struggle for Civil Society in Egypt” 
stated: “My deepest concern here is not 
for me but for Egyptians themselves. Hav-
ing served there as a Foreign Service of-
ficer for three full years, I came to love the 
country, and its people. They deserve bet-
ter. Unfortunately that’s not what they’re 
getting.” This paternalism, linked to the 
clear liberal underpinning12 of such orga-
nizations, should be seen as problematic 
and worrying, rather than as the only solu-
tion to the problems in Arab societies. 
Thus it is clear that while claims to being 
post-Orientalist are being made, they do 
not in actual fact perform a critical act and 
continue to reproduce Western liberal as-
sumptions about what constitutes democ-
racy and how civil society can be used to 
democratize Arab societies.
Gender Equality through Rights-Based 
Approaches 
Discussions on gender and sexuality have 
been central in the literature on the 2010-
2011 uprisings, as gender continues to be 
a key indicator of civilizational standards.13 
This is not a new phenomenon, and dates 
back to the start of the European colonial 
project. Following this, the countries of the 
Middle East and North Africa continue to 
be scrutinized based on how far up the 
ladder they are with regards to gender 
equality. Gender equality here is concep-
tualized according to Rights-Based Ap-
proaches (RBAs) that construct women 
and unorthodox sexual orientation typolo-
gies as special groups with specific prob-
lems. The solutions proposed to said 
‘problems’ are presented (and in turn rep-
resented) as though they are universal and 
neutral, even though they often reproduce 
liberal notions of gender equality. This is 
despite the fact that feminism as a disci-
pline has undergone several ‘critical turns,’ 
the most recent of which led to intersec-
tionality.14 These approaches are repre-
sented as being new and thus distinct 
from previous approaches that were more 
likely to reproduce Eurocentric assump-
tions about gender. It is precisely this per-
formativity of being ‘new’ that is important 
to probe in order to show how many of the 
same assumptions underlie these ‘new’ 
approaches.15
During the 2010-2011 uprisings it became 
increasingly common to hear statements 
about women and either their presence 
or absence within the protests. The main 
problem with such statements is that they 
reproduce a classic liberal feminist trope: 
that of the separation between the public 
and private spheres alongside secular/re-
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ligious binaries. Any transgressions or 
non-transgressions of this separation thus 
become important to the analysis, as is 
clear from articles such as Jessica Wine-
gar’s in American Ethnologist. In this arti-
cle she ‘contrasts’ women’s experiences at 
home with the images of the Egyptian 
revolution in Tahrir, largely dominated by 
men, and implicitly laments the fact that 
although women are major social actors, 
they were unable to take to the streets 
and protest, for a variety of reasons. In 
one scene she explicitly lays out the di-
chotomy between men protesting and 
women cooking (while watching the pro-
tests on television): “Yet here Mona (her 
neighbor) and I were, on what was sure to 
be a defining day in Egypt’s nascent re-
volt, cooking in the kitchen.” In another 
part she speaks of questions she received 
from friends abroad asking her “where 
the women are?” and details her discom-
fort with discussing gender and Arab 
women with friends back home who may 
not be as familiar with the contextual 
specificities and thus may have stereotyp-
ical understandings:
Early on in the uprising, many of us for-
eign academics and journalists in Cairo 
started to receive e-mail inquiries from 
abroad asking us, “Where are the wom-
en in the revolution?” We always have 
to struggle between our suspicion of 
these kinds of questions, loaded as 
they are with very particular presump-
tions about and desires for women in 
the region, and our own feminist inter-
est in women’s activities. 
This therefore positions her as critical 
compared to her friends back home, and 
as someone who is familiar with the con-
text. Thus we see here the representation 
of being critical that is, in effect, non-per-
formative. Despite this, her article clearly 
reproduces a liberal understanding of the 
clear separation between private and 
public as a key element of society. Thus 
the point here is not whether this separa-
tion exists or not, or whether women pro-
tested or not, but rather that the entire ar-
gument serves to solidify the view that the 
public/private sphere is deterministic of 
social relations and that it prevents wom-
en from doing what they really want to do: 
protest in the streets. In order to do this, 
she ignores the literature that deals with 
the role of women workers and Egyptian 
protest movements (Beinin and Lockman; 
Beinin; El-Mahdi), as well as the literature 
that problematizes the over-emphasis of 
public and private spheres in gender anal-
ysis (Okin; Chinkin; Landes; Joseph). 
On the other hand, some posited the 
presence of female protesters as positive 
because they show that “the Arab world 
has come around to the Western world’s 
ways of treating women,” and contrast the 
negative situation of women before the 
uprisings with the empowered positive 
situation of women during the uprisings, 
thus positing a progressive linear teleol-
ogy (Sjoborg and Whooley, forthcoming). 
The negative situation is often explained 
through culturalist reasoning. Culturalist 
representations remain predominant in 
much analysis on the Arab world in gen-
der. This holds true for think-tank literature 
as well. For example, in a research paper 
for Brookings Shadi Hamid writes: “The 
prevailing culture in the Arab world, for 
now at least, does not view women the 
same way that Western cultures do. In oth-
er words, getting to gender equality is 
probably going to take a very long time” 
(Good).
The indicators often used to ‘measure’ the 
status of Arab women usually rely on key 
liberal feminist assumptions regarding 
gender equality. Ranging from the status 
of Arab women’s employment16 to the 
number of Arab women present in gov-
ernment bodies,17 these indicators mea-
sure women’s access to the market and to 
political power that is limited precisely 
because of the absence of social justice. 
The World Bank report on the Arab Spring 
and women even posits that Arab women 
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are having a hard time balancing their 
family life with work, bringing to mind the 
exact trajectory of Eurocentric feminism 
that occurred elsewhere. These indicators 
have become the accepted currency of 
measuring gender equality, and are made 
concrete by indexes such as the Global 
Gender Gap Report. The United Nations 
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Dis-
crimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
also acts as an important determinant of 
the status of Arab gender relations, de-
spite the fact that it is part of the problem-
atic attempt to universalize a Eurocentric 
human rights discourse.18 Importantly, 
these measurements in effect create civi-
lizational hierarchies that rely on gender. 
To conclude, it is notable that despite sev-
eral critical turns within gender studies the 
field of gender and the Middle East con-
tinues to be represented by liberal as-
sumptions and culturalist analysis. Thus 
even new work published after the most 
recent critical turn towards intersectional-
ity in effect reproduces older civilizational 
narratives of gender. This is clear both in 
discussions on the presence/absence of 
women during the uprisings as well as the 
use of sexual rights to delegitimize causes, 
thus clearly demonstrating the non-per-
formativity of the critical turn. Alternative 
approaches that center Marxist or postco-
lonial understandings of gender are one 
way out of simplistic reductionism and the 
representation of civilizational hierarchies 
based on gender and sexuality. These 
would instead emphasize materiality, so-
cial justice and anti-imperialism as impor-
tant lived realities for Middle Eastern 
women, and unpack the ways in which 
these were part and parcel of the Arab up-
risings.
Copts and the ‘Minority Question’ 
The constraining influence of Rights-
Based Approaches can also be seen in re-
lation to understanding events including 
their favorite advocacy target: minorities. 
It is especially odd—perhaps not so much 
when the continuity of Orientalist practic-
es of racism and Eurocentrism are re-
vealed—that think-tankers continue to ad-
vocate a one-size-fits-all approaches to 
‘equal citizenship’ whilst hiding power dy-
namics (Malak, forthcoming). This is re-
flected in the literature that talks about 
how the ‘Arab Spring’ provided an oppor-
tunity for equality and failed; blaming it on 
the region’s inherent ‘democracy deficit’ 
and placing it within a transition to democ-
racy paradigm. This paradigm posits the 
‘minority problem’ in the whole region as 
a fait accompli: that Arabs just have an is-
sue with those who are not Muslim. This 
obstacle is not deconstructed, nor is it 
probed as a colonial artefact. Moreover, 
even some of those ‘minorities’ are oth-
ered, think-tankers claim, in the sense that 
their decisions to support Arab rulers are 
“strange” despite being victims (El-Es-
sawi). By performing this tempocentrism19 
that obscures the colonial legacy and at-
tributes community strength based on 
size and censuses, this classic RBA, which 
rests so firmly on individualism, means 
that in the literature the ‘minority problem’ 
persists. It persists under the racist desig-
nation of the sui generis ‘minority prob-
lem’ with its other namesake of ‘sectarian-
ism.’20 The continuation of Orientalism in 
the literature is so strong that chauvinistic 
attitudes towards Copts in Egypt - for ex-
ample the categorization of a ‘wealthy mi-
nority’ (ibid.), a typical neoliberal prob-
lem—is blamed on Egyptian society’s 
inherent sectarianism rather than neolib-
eralism.21 Often such Orientalism is rein-
forced by yielding to Eurocentric foreign 
entities such as the Catholic Church or the 
Anglican Church as the ‘critical’ voices that 
“predicated extremists [would be] filling 
vacuums left by the ousting of autocratic 
regimes” (ibid). This aims to impose Euro-
pean tempo-historicism by transplanting 
the Church-State clash and separation 
onto the Arab world as the only remedy. 
Not only is it blatantly obvious that the 
Church-State clash is a result of the Euro-
pean Enlightenment, but its remedies are 
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taken to be the remedy to Egypt’s ‘minor-
ity problem’. No attempt is made to pro-
vincialize Enlightenment ideas and the 
sick nationalism it produced resulting in 
the ‘minority problem.’
Such representations are different than 
those that seek to deconstruct the catego-
ry of minority in which alternative histori-
cizations emerge of how the juridical cat-
egory of ‘minority’ was created as 
legitimating for the mandate system 
(Mitchell 99). By understanding how this 
historicization informed the emergence of 
nation-states in the region, such as in Brit-
ain’s Unilateral Declaration of Indepen-
dence of Egypt in 1922 which subjected 
‘independence’ to several conditions, one 
of which was the ‘protection of minorities,’ 
we can begin to formulate alternative cat-
egorizations. This is a profound symptom 
of the region that is riddled with imperial 
high politics; one need only see how the 
treaty of Lausanne of 1923 created over-
night the category of ‘minority’ based only 
on religion as opposed to other markers22 
that continue to be rejected today in Tur-
key by way of this colonial artefact (Tam-
bar). Indeed even from a disciplinary point 
of view the literature on Copts continues 
to enclave itself in a ‘ghetto’ of its own and 
is rarely discussed vis-à-vis other concep-
tualizations, if at most it is with discussions 
on other minorities—this seems to largely 
be the exception that confirms the rule of 
the rigidity of the category of ‘minority’ as 
a marker of religion (Philipp 1995). The 
concept, theoretically and disciplinarily, 
cannot seem to have conversations with 
other disciplines and theories. This contri-
bution here firmly positions itself within 
the question of neoliberalism and Orien-
talism at large in a hope to move past this 
deadlock. Alternative theorizations may 
wish to explore the emergence of capital-
ism with respect to different classes, fac-
tions, communal groups and different ge-
ographies during colonial Egypt using the 
approach of Uneven and Combined De-
velopment (U&CD) to explain how certain 
groups accumulated capital which today 
is policed by a marker of religion.
Conclusion 
This paper aimed to make a two-fold argu-
ment: to demonstrate that claims to being 
critical and post-Orientalist within Middle 
East studies are often non-performative 
and therefore do not complete the act 
they claim to undertake; and second, to 
show that instead, the performativity is 
one that consolidates the neoliberaliza-
tion of the region. It should come as no 
surprise that the Middle East has been and 
continues to be the product of neoliberal-
ism. In fact the very inception of the geo-
spatial concept was the very product of 
neoliberal governmentality: a savvy Aus-
tralian Navy officer by the name of Robert 
Jackson who was responsible for coordi-
nating trade bottlenecks during World 
War II fleshed out the term ‘the Middle 
East’ and gave it its meaning (Mazower). 
This is far more elucidating than the wide-
spread conception that it was Alfred Ma-
han who coined the term, and it should 
come as no surprise that this was the ge-
nealogy presented in the special issue of 
Security Dialogue titled The new Middle 
East: A Critical Appraisal as mentioned in 
the first part of the paper (Christou and 
Adamides). This genealogy shows the 
neoliberal governmentality behind the 
history of the region: it was viewed 
through the logic of foreign trade with re-
spect to foreign powers. 
It is clear that to hide underlying causes of 
the uprisings, a similar cloak was needed 
to hide neoliberalism. This involved a rich 
tapestry of ‘Islamic’ discourse that em-
braced neoliberalism head on, accepted 
the ‘failed state’ thesis, the white man’s 
burden, and welcomed foreign aid (in fact 
even asking why it was postponed), all in 
a new ‘critical’ fashion that was post-posi-
tivist. It also included the continuation of 
culturalist assumptions in approaches to 
gender, sexuality, and minorities that un-
derline the civilizational hierarchy domi-
nating Middle East studies even today. 
Karim Malak
is a MA Candidate at Columbia 
University, Middle Eastern, South 
Asian, African Studies (MESAAS), 
New York, USA. His research interests 
include postcolonialism, International 
Relations Theory, critical security studies, 
neoliberalism and post-development 
in Egypt. Malak’s most recent works 
include “False Ideas about ‘Activism’ in 
Egypt and the Case of Egypt’s Copts: 
Outside the State an “The US Religious 
Freedom Agenda: Blowback against 
Egypt’s Coptic ‘Activists’?” in Beyond the 
‘Arab Spring’ in North Africa: Micro- and 
Macro-Perspectives, Indiana University 
Press (forthcoming).
email: kmm2282@columbia.edu
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #04–2015
FoCUs 105
This was done with Fukuyama’s same de-
terministic attitude but not in an end of 
history thesis, but in an end of the Orien-
talism thesis. The ultimate irony, and sad 
reality, is that Orientalism is alive and well. 
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2 Neil Lazaraus has argued 
that postcolonial approaches 
fixate on the representational 
aspect of Orientalism and 
fail to grasp the materiality of 
representational politics. We 
subscribe to Lazaraus’ take 
and locate Orientalist politics 
within the representation of 
an anteriority of the Middle 
East using a materialist 
outlook can move past this 
impasse. We also show 
how continued Orientalist 
representations further a 
neoliberal agenda.
Notes
1 A clear example is a 2012 
US Institute of Peace report, 
that stated the following: In 
February 2011, a workshop 
at Stanford University 
cosponsored [sic] by 
USIP, George Washington 
University’s Institute for 
Public Diplomacy and 
Global Communication, 
and Stanford’s Liberation 
Technology Program 
discussed the state of the 
art in empirical research 
and theory development 
relevant to the emerging 
Arab struggles. The scholars, 
activists, and representatives 
from technology companies 
particularly focused on the 
new data that might be used 
to address these urgent 
theoretical questions. In 
September 2011, a similar 
group convened at USIP in 
Washington, D.C., alongside 
senior U.S. policy officials 
to present new research to 
a public audience and to 
continue the conversation in 
a private workshop.
3 The post-positivist turn 
denotes a theoretical 
approach that does not 
subscribe to objective and 
neutral formulations of 
knowledge as reflecting 
an external reality, but 
instead one that looks 
at performativity. Judith 
Butler captures this point 
succinctly: “performativity 
seeks to counter a certain 
kind of positivism according 
we which we might begin 
with already delimitated 
understandings of what 
gender, the state, and the 
economy are.” For more see 
Judith Butler (“Performative 
Agency” 147). 
4 Hobson has been among 
the first to say that World 
politics at the international 
level have a Eurocentric 
discourse performed through 
the concept of the ‘failed 
state’ as a civilizational 
burden similar to the ‘white 
man’s burden’. This argument 
has not been made with 
respect to the Arab uprisings 
before.
5 Hobson’s argument that 
imperial era racism was 
repackaged into realism, 
through anarchy, as a 
feature of the international 
world provides an accurate 
genealogy of how this 
theoretical notion polices 
non-Eurocentric parts of the 
world today.
6 For examples of works 
that cite the US promotion 
of ‘moderate Islamists’ and 
the failure of the ‘moderate 
thesis’ see: Zaheer Kazmi.
7 For a concise history of 
the racial underpinnings of 
political science in general 
and the development of the 
Journal of Race Development 
see Robert Vitalis (“Making 
Racism Invisible”; “Birth of a 
Discipline”).
8 See call for papers by 
the journal titled Security. 
Humanities and Social 
Science Net Online, 24 




9 The IMF deal has been 
frozen after a change of 
power in Egypt on June 12, 
2013 that saw the ouster 
of Morsi, only a ‘staff level 
agreement’ was signed 
under Morsi in November 
2012 with the remainder of 
the deal to be negotiated 
and ratified by the incoming 
parliament resulting in the 
delay as late as June 2013. 
For more see: “IMF Reaches 
Staff-Level Agreement with 
Egypt on US$ 4.8 Billion 
Stand-By Agreement.” 
IMF Press Release 12/446. 
International Monetary Fund, 
20 Nov. 2012. Web. 3 May 
2015. 
10 See CNN correspondent 
Becky Anderson’s interview 
with Mohamed El Baradei 
and her Orientalist question 
if Egypt is a ‘failed state’. 
“El Baradai: Egypt is a ‘Failed 
State.’” Online video clip. 
Youtube. Youtube, 14 Feb. 
2013. Web. 3 May 2015. 
––›
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #04–2015
FoCUs 106
13 For more, see: Towns 
(“Status of Women”; 
“Civilization”).
14 There is a debate 
surrounding the question of 
what exactly intersectionality 
is: an approach, a framework, 
a methodology, or a 
discipline. In this paper we 
treat it as an approach to 
gender analysis. 
15 A clear example of 
this is the ways in which 
intersectionality, although 
posited as post-positivist and 
critical, often reproduces 
liberal identity politics 
and thus continues to 
perpetuate Eurocentrism. 
For more, see: Carbin, 
Maria, and Sara Edenheim. 
“The Intersectional Turn in 
Feminist Theory: A Dream 
of a Common Language?” 
European Journal of 
Women’s Studies 20.3 (2013): 
233-248. Web. 3 May 2015. 
16 See: World Bank. “Missing 
Voices: Gender Equality in 
the Arab World.” Worldbank.
org. World Bank, 14 Mar. 2014. 
Web 3 May 2015. 
See: Ghanem, Hafez. 
“Inclusive Growth after the 
Arab Spring.” Brookings.edu. 
Brookings, 30 Jan. 2013. Web. 
3 May 2015. 
11 The definition of civil 
society is contentious, 
despite an apparent 
agreement in the literature 
on the Middle East, where 
it is most often referring to 
the representation of non-
governmental organizations. 
A more Marxist definition, 
on the other hand which 
needless to say is not 
represented at all, would 
argue that civil society 
refers to much more and 
that it encapsulates almost 
all non-state institutions 
and actors including most 
importantly classes outside 
the ruling class. For the sake 
of this argument, however, 
we assume that civil society 
represents non-governmental 
organizations. 
12 Indeed Dunne went on 
to state: “Egyptian NGOs 
committed to democracy 
could play a major role in 
steering the government 
to liberal political change, 
and drawing the attention 
of the world to its successes 
and shortcoming. But the 
government of Egypt has 
moved swiftly to forestall this 
possibility.”
17 See: Mabrouk, Mirette F. 
“The Precarious Position 
of Women and Minorities 
in Arab Spring Countries.” 
brookings.edu. Brookings, 1 
June 2012. Web. 3 May 2015. 
18 For example, see: “Poll 
Ranks Egypt Worst Arab 
State for Women.” Project 
on Middle East Democracy. 
POMED, n.d. Web. 3 May 
2015. 
19 The term tempocentrism 
coined by John 
Hobson designates 
the temporalization of 
politics such that certain 
periodizations and linearity is 
favored, making explanations 
that can arrive to the present 
neatly. For more see Hobson.
20 The use of the problematic 
analytical concept of 
‘sectarianism’ is widespread 
in the literature. See Tadros.
21 These attitudes arise 
out of the uneven and 
combined development of 
capitalism in which a rising 
class is ostracized by way of 
singling out a particular trait 
of that class. In this case it 
is that of a Coptic Christian 
businessmen-Naguib Sawiris-
often the same ostracization 
can be at play with female 
businessmen and members 
of different class factions of 
the ancien régime. Examples 
of such attitudes towards 
other groups of society after 
intense implementation 
of neoliberalism include 
anti-Chinese sentiment in 
Indonesia after IMF imposed 
conditions in 1997. For more 
see Klein (Shock Doctrine).
22 Kabir Tambar details 
how the question of the 
community group of Alevis 
continues to be sidelined 
because minority groups as 
recognized by the treaty of 
Lausanne are only defined 
along a religious axis. This 
shows the precarious nature 
and limits of the concept 
of ‘minority.’ Tambar details 
how other mechanisms of 
inclusion and exclusion of 
subjects, in the transition 
from empire to state better 
grasp and locate such 
representations that are 
outside the nation-state. 
One can use Tambar’s 
concept of belonging and 
representation and apply 
it to Copts in Egypt to 
better grasp dynamics of 
topographic inclusion and 
the representations of ‘Coptic 
communities’ as opposed to 
the continued persistence of 
the ‘Coptic question’ vis-à-vis 
the state. For such nationalist 
representations that describe 
an impasse between the state 
and Copts see Issandr El 
Amrani (“Coptic Question”). 
––›
––› 
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